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CONCLUDING REMARKS
HUMAN RIGHTS, DOMESTIC COURTS, AND
EFFECTIVE REMEDIES
JUDGE EDWARD D. RE*
It was entirely to be expected that in any discussion of human
rights one would have heard references to the American Declara-
tion of Independence. It contains words that hold great signifi-
cance to all of us: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Lib-
erty and the Pursuit of Happiness."' Our philosophy of govern-
ment is expressed by the next sentence: "That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed."2 The Declaration is
truly a great document, and we, as Americans, can be justifiably
proud.
Throughout our symposium we heard references to the Decla-
ration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.
Countless references could have been made to the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights.3 That Universal Declaration is an-
* Chief Judge Emeritus of the United States Court of International Trade and
Distinguished Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. Judge Re was
Chairman of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States and
Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. He served as Chair
for the American Bar Association's Section of International and Comparative Law, as
President of the American Society of Comparative Law and is a Member Emeritus of
the Board of Higher Education of the City of New York. Having served in World War
II and during the Korean conflict, Judge Re is a Colonel in the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department of the United States Air Force (Retired).
1 Tim DECLARA TON OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2 Id.
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GJA Res. 217A (11), 3 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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other great pronouncement of rights and ideals. I believe that it is
destined to be the forerunner of a modern Magna Carta for human
beings everywhere.
The Universal Declaration was the first concrete step
designed to fulfill the pledge enshrined throughout the Charter of
the United Nations:4 to promote universal respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. Of
course, having referred to the Declaration of Independence and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we must be reminded
that we are speaking of declarations, and statements of goals.
Those statements of ideals and lofty principles are merely aspira-
tional. Further action is required to give them the legal status
and binding force of law.
As for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
subject that brings us together, the experience of the United Na-
tions may be said to parallel that of the United States. Our na-
tion, too, first proclaimed lofty goals and ideals in a Declaration.
May I add parenthetically, that I regard the Declaration of Inde-
pendence to be the crowning achievement of eighteenth century
philosophy. Since that historic day in 1776, it has been the sol-
emn responsibility of all Americans to give life and meaning to the
self-evident truths or ideals set forth in that Declaration. The
question is: What remains to be done to give life to that document
and have it breathe as living law? The drafting of the Constitu-
tion followed, and slowly, painfully, but inevitably, laws were
passed, and still are currently being enacted, to make the ideals of
that Declaration the living law of the United States. The goal has
been to have our laws reflect, and be the embodiment and fulfill-
ment of what may be called the pledge or promise of 1776.
Just as we have made admirable progress domestically in
achieving those stated ideals for the largest number of Americans,
we also have a moral and legal commitment to help fulfill those
ideals set forth in the Universal Declaration for all people every-
where. How else can we say to the rest of the world that we are
striving to foster human rights and fundamental freedoms, which
is the promise of the Charter? Although as Americans we are
4 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (stating purpose of "encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all"), art. 13, para. 1(b) (mandat-
ing studies aimed at "the realization of human rights and fimdamental freedoms for
all"), art. 68 (directing establishment of commissions "for the promotion of human
rights").
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closer to an era of fulfillment, in many parts of the world it is still
an era of despair, of an awakening, and of expectation.
On the international scene, more ought to be done to fulfill
our responsibility in supporting covenants on human rights. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a great step forward.
It was only a first step, however, and surely we cannot rest upon
that achievement alone. The task now before us is to embody
those ideals, so beautifully set forth in the Universal Declaration,
in the form of covenants that have the status of law.
Our topic today was somewhat more limited than the interna-
tional protection of human rights. Our subject was designed to
explore the extent to which the cause of human rights can be prop-
erly and legally promoted and fostered before the domestic courts.
Hence, the title of our symposium: "Human Rights Before Domes-
tic Courts."
The program covered a variety of topics. All of them were in-
teresting, and all of them were discussed by qualified scholars. I
had looked forward to hearing those speakers who dealt with the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA7)5 to learn the extent to
which cases that involve human rights questions can properly be
heard before the domestic courts.
An important area pertains to the ability of persons who have
been the victims of mistreatment or torture by a foreign country to
resort to the courts of the United States for redress. International
lawyers are familiar with the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Before 1952, the United States, in general terms, took the position
that foreign states were absolutely immune from civil suits in the
American courts.' Until that time injured citizens would have to
depend almost entirely upon the executive branch to negotiate
with foreign states in an effort to obtain redress, or some form of
settlement. This diplomatic remedy, as it was called, was totally
discretionary. Hence, depending upon a variety of factors, per-
haps totally unrelated to the wrong sought to be redressed, the
State Department would determine whether to pursue or espouse
the claim.
Although it was announced in 1948 that the State Depart-
ment was reconsidering the policy, it was not until 1952 that the
5 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (West Supp. 1993).
6 26 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 984, 985 (1952) (referring to past policy of "absolute" sover-
eign immunity (citing May 19, 1952 letter from Jack B. Tate, then Acting Legal Ad-
viser for Department of State, to Acting Attorney General)).
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American position changed and the "restrictive theory of sover-
eign immunity" was adopted.7 Under this new theory, or policy,
sovereign immunity would be granted or recognized with regard to
sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a foreign state, but would
not be granted as to commercial or private acts (jure gestionis),
It is worthy of note that this newer policy of the United States
brought the United States in harmony with the modern trend of
international law on the subject. For example, a foreign state that
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States would not
be immune, and would be liable as would any other private entity
for a claim or cause of action based upon that commercial activity.
The international legal community assumed that the FSIA,
enacted in 1976, was enacted to depoliticize the sovereign immu-
nity decision process, by transferring the question in particular
cases from the State Department to the courts. It seemed clear
that the declared purpose of the FSIA was to define the restrictive
theory of foreign sovereign immunity, and to set forth the excep-
tions when a foreign sovereign would not be immune from suit.9
Another purpose of the FSIA was to assure uniform treatment of
foreign states before the American courts. 10 In summary, foreign
sovereign immunity would apply under the FSIA unless the cause
of action or case brought was embraced within one or more of the
seven exceptions set forth in the Act.--
Several interesting and important cases have come before the
courts that have required interpretation and application of the
FSIA. One of these cases is Nelson v. Saudi Arabia,'" which I
have been asked to discuss. Because of the important issues
raised, the case is presently before the Supreme Court of the
United States.13 The case has attracted some attention, and has
7 Id.
8 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605.
9 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (West Supp. 1993)
(declaration of purpose); see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1976)
and S. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6605-06.
10 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1976) and S. REP. No. 1310, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604-06.
11 The general rules of immunity are found in section 1604 of the FSIA. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 1604 (West Supp. 1993). The exceptions are set forth in section 1605 of the
FSIA. See 28 U.S.C.A- § 1605 (West Supp. 1993).
12 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S.Ct. 1471 (1993).
13 Subsequent to the remarks delivered by Judge Re on March 12, 1993, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals's decision in Nelson.
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been the subject of renewed legislative interest in the FSIA and
human rights before American courts.
The facts of Nelson are quite straightforward as are the issues
presented. The plaintiff, Scott Nelson, while in the United States,
saw a printed advertisement recruiting employees for the King
Faisal Specialist Hospital in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.14 The Hospi-
tal Corporation of America, under contract with the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, conducted in the United States the recruitment of
American employees for the hospital.15
Nelson was interviewed in Saudi Arabia for a position by two
hospital officials. 16 After returning to Florida, Nelson was hired
and entered into a contract of employment with the hospital as a
monitoring systems engineer. 17
In accordance with the Hospital's job description for a moni-
toring systems engineer, "Nelson was 'responsible for the develop-
ment and expansion of electronic monitoring and control systems
capabilities.' He was also responsible for recommending 'modifica-
The Court took a narrow view of "based on" and "commercial" acts as used in the
FSIA. See Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1477-1481. Although the Court disagreed with the
reading of the appellate court, it nonetheless expressly left open the possibility of
reading the statute expansively, within the limit set by its holding. See id. at 1478 n.4
("[W]e do not address the case where a claim consists of both commercial and sover-
eign elements."). The court of appeals decision in Nelson set in motion the legislative
reaction that led to the passage of the TVPA. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, asserted
that "taking [Nelson's] allegations as true... petitioners' contacts with the United
States in this case are, in my view, plainly sufficient to subject petitioners to suit in
this country on a claim arising out of its nonimmune commercial activity relating to
respondent." Id. at 1488-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens added, in cir-
cumstances such as Nelson in which the foreign nation was "seek[ing] out the benefits
of the private marketplace, it must, like any private party, bear the burdens and re-
sponsibilities imposed by that marketplace." Id. at 1489. (Editor's note).
14 Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1530.
16 Id.
Is Id.
17 Id. The contract of employment was executed in Miami, Florida, in November
1983. Id. "[T]he House Report that accompanied the Immunities Act states that the
making of 'a single contract' in the United States can support jurisdiction." Santos v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 6604,
6615). The House Report further stated that "a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by a foreign state would include not only a commercial transaction per-
formed and executed in its entirety in the United States.. . ." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6615 (emphasis
added).
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tions of existing equipment and the purchase and installation of
new equipment.' ' 8
Nelson was summoned to the hospital's security office after he
observed, in the course of his duties, certain hazards which he
reported to an investigative commission of the Saudi govern-
ment.19 He alleged that he was subsequently taken to a jail cell
where he was "shackled, tortured, and beaten" by Saudi govern-
ment agents.2 °
After his release and return to the United States, Nelson sued
Saudi Arabia, the hospital, and the hospital's purchasing agent in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida, asserting that the court had subject matter jurisdiction under
the FSIA.21 The district court granted Saudi Arabia's motion for
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that
the "link between the recruitment activities and the [diefendants
is not sufficient to establish 'substantial contact' with the United
States" 22 within the meaning of the commercial exception of the
FSIA.23 Moreover, the district court "noted that, 'even if the court
had found that... Saudi Arabia had carried on commercial activi-
ties having substantial contact with the United States through
the indirect recruitment activities,'" there still would not be a suf-
ficient nexus between the activities and the complaint to maintain
the cause of action.24
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed and remanded, finding both "substantial contact" with the
United States, based on the recruitment activities, and the re-
quired nexus between the cause of action and those activities.25
In a discussion of the Nelson case, it is to be noted that Nel-
son's claims resulted solely from a contract of employment formed
in the United States. Nelson's difficulties began when, in the per-
formance of the duties set forth in his job description, he reported
safety violations.26
18 Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1530 (quoting Hospital's job description for monitoring sys-
tems engineer).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1530 (citing Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, No. 88-1791, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 11, 1989) [hereinafter Nelson I]).
23 See 28 U.S.C-. § 1603(e) (West Supp. 1993).
24 Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1530 (quoting Nelson , at 8).
25 Id. at 1536.
26 Id. at 1535-36.
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The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary on the
FSIA, which was signed into law by President Gerald R. Ford in
1976, stated that the FSIA was enacted to provide "when and how
parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its enti-
ties in the courts of the United States and to provide when a for-
eign state is entitled to immunity."2 7 As indicated, under the
FSIA, a foreign sovereign is immune from suit in the United
States unless an enumerated exception applies. In Nelson, for ex-
ample, the foreign sovereign, Saudi Arabia, could be sued in the
United States if the cause of action was based on a "commercial
activity" conducted in the United States.
As a result of the Nelson case, attention was focused on the
problem of Americans who are employed abroad and subjected to
human rights violations or torture28 in the foreign country. In
Nelson, after the reversal of the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs cause of action, the State Department joined in a re-
quest for a rehearing en banc. 9 When the circuit court did not
grant the rehearing, the State Department joined the defendants
in support of the petition urging the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari. °
Apart from a discussion of the judicial decision of the court of
appeals and the legal questions raised in its interpretation and
application of the FSIA, it must be noted that there has also been
a legislative response to Nelson. Hearings were held before the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
which filed a report that discussed possible amendments to the
FSIA.
The committee report stated at the outset that legislation is
necessary to clarify and expand the circumstances in which an
American, who is injured abroad by a foreign government, can
bring suit in the courts of the United States against that govern-
27 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
C.C.A.N. 6604, 6604.
28 It is important to note that Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights expressly prohibits torture. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res.
217A (I), 3 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), Doc. A/810 (1948). Article 5 states: "No one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment." Id.
29 Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1476 (1993).
30 See Amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Hearing on H.R.
2357 Before the Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration and Refugees, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings].
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ment under the FSIA.3 ' It would seem clear that the purpose was
not to restrict the holding of the court of appeals in Nelson, but to
expand the circumstances under which an American may be able
to sue in the courts of the United States. More specifically, the
proposed legislation addressed torture and extrajudicial killing.32
The committee report acknowledged that "[t]orture is a viola-
tion of international law and has been universally condemned by
the nations of the world."33 It observed that "[i]n recent years,
several U.S. citizens have been tortured abroad and have faced
difficulties in obtaining a remedy"34 because "Oludicial remedies
are often not available in countries where torture is prevalent."3 "
When it is not possible to obtain a judicial remedy, citizens enlist
the help of the State Department in an effort to obtain a remedy
through diplomatic channels. The report, however, indicated that
"this is not always a viable alternative,"36 and that the State De-
partment "may have no more success than the citizen in obtaining
a remedy."3 7 In addition, the State Department's traditional role
"of being a conciliator and maintaining foreign relations may con-
flict with its role of defending the rights of U.S. citizens."3 8 The
report recounted that "in one recent case, the State Department
actually filed a brief before the Supreme Court on behalf of Saudi
Arabia, asking the Court to overturn an 11th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision which had allowed a U.S. citizen to sue Saudi Ara-
bia under the FSIA."39
This Judiciary Committee report noted that at the subcom-
mittee hearing on House Bill 2357, held on May 13, 1992, "admin-
istration witnesses repeatedly voiced concern that the FSIA
should not be amended in any way that might offend foreign gov-
ernments."40 Specifically, they testified that "[d]omestic judicial
proceedings and remedies which intrude on the sovereign conduct
of a foreign state may have political significance and consequences
with foreign policy ramifications."4
31 H.R. REP. No. 900, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1992).
32 Id. at 3-4.
33 Id. at 3.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 H.R. REP. No. 900, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1992).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Hearings, supra note 30, at 52.
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Although these administration witnesses gave several nega-
tive aspects of amending the existing provisions of the FSIA,42 the
report continued:
While sensitive to the precept that the United States should
avoid unilateral actions that would impose American legal prin-
ciples upon foreign governments, the Committee believes that
the attitude of these witnesses reflects an abdication of the
United States' moral responsibility to provide leadership in the
area of human rights by undertaking efforts to extend the scope
of international laws protecting those rights. In this instance,
the administration's inordinate deference to real or imagined
sensitivities of unnamed foreign governments is particularly dis-
turbing because it directly affects the rights of U.S. citizens to
have their day in court. The Committee believes that an action
constituting a violation of settled international law-in this case
torture or extrajudicial killing-is no more acceptable when com-
mitted by foreign government than by anyone else.43
The Committee Report on House Bill 2357 also discussed the
Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), which was signed into
law in 1992.4 The TVPA provides a civil cause of action against
individuals who inflict torture, but does not itself address the lia-
bility of the foreign nation.45 Hence, the TVPA may not be avail-
able to all U.S. citizens who are tortured abroad because, in many
cases, the plaintiff may not be able to obtain personal jurisdiction
over the individual torturers, or may not even know their identi-
ties. The FSIA also is territorially restrictive since it currently
allows U.S. citizens to sue foreign sovereigns only for torts that
the foreign sovereign committed in the United States, 46 but not for
torts that the foreign sovereign committed on its own soil.47 In-
deed, the practical barriers that have been experienced by some
U.S. citizens in obtaining a remedy for torture suffered abroad
served to highlight the need for House Bill 2357.4 8 The report rec-
ognized that a foreign sovereign who practices torture or summary
execution violates international law.49 Nonetheless, under pres-
ent law, an American citizen who is tortured or executed abroad
42 H.R. REP. No. 900, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1992).
43 Id. at 4.
44 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
45 H.R. REP. No. 900, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992).
46 Id.
47Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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cannot sue the foreign sovereign in the United States courts even
when the foreign country wrongly refuses to hear the citizen's
case.50 Therefore, in some instances a United States citizen who
was tortured will be without a remedy. The express purpose of
House Bill 2357 is to provide a remedy for those in that precise
situation before the United States courts." House Bill 2357
would amend the FSIA by providing American citizens who are
grievously mistreated abroad with an effective remedy for dam-
ages in some tribunal, either in the country where the mistreat-
ment occurred, or in the United States.2 The bill, therefore,
would add a new exception to the FSIA that would allow suits
against foreign sovereigns that subject U.S. citizens to torture or
extrajudicial killing, and do not provide adequate remedies for
those harms.
An additional word about the background of this legislation
may be helpful. It was introduced by Mr. Lawrence J. Smith on
May 15, 1991, and was referred to the Committee on the Judici-
ary.5 3 The statement of Representative Smith at the time of the
hearings is enlightening. Mr. Smith spoke specifically of the Nel-
son case as a catalyst for the legislation.54 It is noteworthy that
the events which surrounded Scott Nelson were not limited to
Scott Nelson, and that his case was not unique-other persons
had been similarly mistreated. Mr. Smith summarized the Nelson
case, and, after recounting the tribulations of Scott Nelson, both
in Saudi Arabia and in the United States, quoted Nelson as hav-
ing said that he was bitterly opposed by the State Department. 55
Mr. Smith stated, "[fiortunately, the appeals court reversed and
remanded this case back to the district court,"56 and noted that
the Supreme Court had asked the State Department for its com-
ment on the case.5 7 Mr. Smith also noted that the State Depart-
ment's human rights report lists countries that continuously vio-
late internationally recognized human rights as reflected by the
number of documented cases of human rights abuses.5"
50 H.R. REP. No. 900, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992).
51 Id. at 4-5.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 5.
54 Hearings, supra note 30, at 5-7 (statement of Fla. Rep. Lawrence J. Smith).
55 Id. at 6.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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Mr. Smith made his views quite clear. He stated that Ameri-
can citizens hired by a foreign state and injured by officials of that
state should be allowed to sue a foreign government in this coun-
try, particularly since the foreign country had been allowed to re-
cruit those employees within the United States.5 9
Injured Americans deserve their day in an American court which
embraces our judicial framework and our laws. Let the facts de-
cide the case. If a foreign state avails itself of the benefits of do-
ing business here, then that government should be prepared to
put itself before the fairest legal system in the world.60
Mr. Smith remarked that he "introduced this bill because some
Americans were being refused help from their own Government
and because our courts are uncertain about their ability to hear
these cases."6 '
This proposal would not affect the underlying tort law. The
proposal would address only the issue of jurisdiction, specifically
conferring it in certain circumstances where the current law is
vague. 62 Representative Smith added:
[This bill would not] help Scott Nelson, Jim Smrkovski, Luben
Ivanhoff, Colete Powers or John Keene, who are those Americans
who were tortured who came here to Washington last spring [to
testify], but it could provide a small bit of relief for any American
who receives similar appalling treatment in the future. And, Mr.
Chairman, we shouldn't believe that that won't happen. If you
read this year's human rights report filed according to statute by
the State Department, you will see numerous countries listed
where numerous cases of torture are documented. So it does
happen and it could happen to Americans.63
I will read only one more sentence from the statement of Mr.
Smith before the House Judiciary Committee: 'We should not
leave the rights of Americans to the vagaries of foreign policy."64
I congratulate Mr. Smith and his colleagues on the Judiciary
Committee and conclude my remarks on Nelson by noting that the
courts cannot isolate themselves from the great moral issues of
the day. In the application of law, courts, as other organs of gov-
ernment, must also think of the consequences of their decisions
59 Hearings, supra note 30, at 7 (statement of Fla. Rep. Lawrence J. Smith).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Hearings, supra note 30, at 7 (statement of Fla. Rep. Lawrence J. Smith).
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and of their effect on human rights. In the application of law,
courts cannot risk the fate of becoming irrelevant in their crucial
role of applying the law as an instrument of justice. In a sympo-
sium on human rights it is also appropriate to recall that statutes,
unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed, may be construed
in accordance with international legal norms. In an ABA Commit-
tee Report on Judicial Education on International Law, it is noted
that the applicability of international legal norms in particular
cases may be limited by considerations of jurisdiction, equity, and
due process that apply in all proceedings before the U.S. courts. It
is hoped, however, that those "considerations not be invoked
merely to disguise an unwillingness to accord international legal
norms their rightful place in our legal system."65 By a reasonable
interpretation of the commercial activity exception of the FSIA,
the Eleventh Circuit's decision permitted Nelson to prove the
truth of his allegations, and afforded the defendants their day in
court. A reversal would relegate Nelson to the plight in which in-
dividuals similarly situated found themselves before the enact-
ment of FSIA.
Human Rights Before Domestic Courts has been the subject
matter of our symposium. It has dealt with human rights, but not
merely as ideals, or goals. We mean human rights to be realized,
and to be vindicated by an effective remedy. Hence, the question
should no longer be whether there is a right not to be tortured.
The question today is: How can the victim obtain an effective
remedy?
In this symposium we have attempted, and I believe we have
succeeded, in casting light on the initial question posed: To what
extent can the domestic courts be utilized to give a remedy in
those cases when people have suffered human rights violations,
and wish effective redress or remedy? We have had eminently
qualified speakers, and know that our symposium has taught us a
great deal that will help us achieve, in the words of Dean Pound,
"effective legal action."66
65 Judicial Education on International Law Committee of the Section of Interna-
tional Law of the American Bar Association: Final Report, 24 1NT'L LAW. 903, 915
(1990).
66 Roscoe Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, An Address Before the
Pennsylvania Bar Association (June 27, 1916) in 3 A.B.A. J. 55, and in THE LAWY R's
TAnsuRY 223 (Eugene C. Gerhart ed., 1956).
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